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Abstract 
Research demonstrates a complex relationship between television viewing and fear of crime. So-
cial critics assert that media depictions perpetuate the dominant cultural ideology about crime and 
criminal justice. This article examines whether program type differentially affects fear of crime and 
perceptions of the crime rate. Next, it tests whether such programming differentially affects view-
ers’ attitudes about the criminal justice system, and if these relationships are mediated by fear. Re-
sults indicated that fear mediated the relationship between viewing nonfictional shows and lack of 
support for the justice system. Viewing crime dramas predicted support for the death penalty, but 
this relationship was not mediated by fear. News viewership was unrelated to either fear or atti-
tudes. The results support the idea that program type matters when it comes to understanding peo-
ple’s fear of crime and their attitudes about criminal justice. 
R esearch has addressed how media consumption in its various forms—newspapers, tele-vision news, and crime dramas—influences viewers’ perceptions of crime in their so-
cial worlds, their level of concern or fear of victimization, and their attitudes about the crim-
inal justice system. Previous research has also emphasized how variations in content across 
program types may differentially affect viewers’ perceptions. Although attention has been 
given to the impact of television news, network crime dramas, and reality shows like “COPS” 
and “America’s Most Wanted,” less attention has been given to the nonfictional documentary 
style programming aired by network stations and proliferated on cable channels. Shows like 
ABC’s “Primetime,” A & E’s “The First 48,” and Discovery’s “The New Detectives” use dra-
matic elements, peppered with interviews of criminal justice personnel, victims, offenders, 
witnesses, and academic experts, to tell stories about a particular criminal event or series of 
events. In fact, there is now an entire channel dedicated to this kind of programming, ID: In-
vestigation Discovery. Unlike “COPS,” these kinds of shows, when they do follow the police, 
usually follow detectives or forensic analysts as they try to solve a mystery. Unlike “America’s 
Most Wanted,” they do not engage the viewer in finding the alleged offender. As an emerging 
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genre in its own right, nonfictional documentary-style programming further blurs the line 
between crime reporting as done by the news media and fictional crime dramas like “CSI: 
Crime Scene Investigation” (Cavender and Deutch 2007). A description of the series “Watch-
ing the Detectives,” which airs on Biography Channel, highlights this point: 
What’s the inspiration behind legendary television crime series like NYPD Blue 
and Law & Order? It’s the extraordinary, dramatic, often hair-raising true tales 
of New York City detectives. Now for the first time, hard-boiled, street savvy, 
larger-than-life veteran detectives of the NYPD are coming forward to relive 
the most unbelievable, entertaining, and often shocking cases of their careers. 
They’ve seen it all on the streets of New York and they’re ready to share their 
unflinching first-hand accounts. (Biography Channel 2009) 
The question remains regarding whether nonfictional documentary style crime program-
ming affects viewers’ level of fear about crime and attitudes about criminal justice and how 
this may differ from other crime show formats. To address this question, the current article 
builds on the body of research that has linked media viewership, fear of crime, and attitudes 
about the criminal justice system. In particular, we focus on four program types: local news, 
national news, crime dramas, and nonfictional documentary-style crime shows. Although 
previous research has tested the relationship between program type and fear of crime (Es-
chholz, Chiricos, and Gertz 2003) and the mediating effect of fear between viewership and 
attitudes about criminal justice (Dowler 2003), little research has done both. 
In this article, we outline the research on television exposure and fear of crime. Then, we 
describe crime shows as sources of infotainment, in which viewers learn about crime in a 
context that may amplify fears. In particular, we highlight the emerging genre of nonfictional 
documentary-style shows as a program type distinct from dramas and reality shows. Fi-
nally, we discuss how crime-related programming serves the ideological function of support-
ing the dominant views about crime and justice issues. Using data from a random sample of 
adults, the analyses explored how viewing the different types of crime-related programming 
influenced viewers’ fear of crime, their perceptions about the criminal justice system, and 
their support for the death penalty. We also examined whether fear of crime mediated the re-
lationship between viewing certain program types and attitudinal outcomes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Television Exposure and Fear of Crime 
Modern research on the impact of television exposure and crime began with the Cul-
tural Indicators Project (Signorielli, Gerbner, and Morgan 1995). These researchers, led 
by George Gerbner, forwarded the “cultivation hypothesis,” asserting that heavy televi-
sion viewing engenders fear, mistrust, and perceptions that the world is a dangerous place 
(Gerbner 1970; Gerbner and Gross 1976). The result, according to Gerbner and Gross 
(1976), is increased compliance with and reliance on governmental authority, as well as le-
gitimization of social control policies.   
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However, as research has progressed, it has revealed that the relationship between 
television consumption and fear of crime is more complex than initially posited in the 
cultivation literature. Some studies have noted a correlation between television view-
ing and fear or anxiety about crime; others have not (Eschholz 1997; Ditton et al. 2004; 
Doyle 2006). From their review of the research, Heath and Gilbert concluded that “at 
least some television programming is correlated with fear of crime for at least some of 
the viewers” (Heath and Gilbert 1996: 380). Such inconsistencies stimulated so-called 
reception research (e.g., Dahlgren 1988), in which audience characteristics and program 
characteristics are considered key variables in understanding viewership effects (Es-
chholz 2003). For example, studies that examine news programming and fear of crime 
find some relationship between media consumption and fear, but the strength of this 
relationship varies (Chiricos, Eschholz, and Gertz 1997; Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz 
2000;Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). Factors like type of programming, the messages within 
the programming (e.g., the degree of “justice” evident in the program), and audience 
characteristics all complicate the relationship (Heath and Gilbert 1996; Eschholz et al. 
2003). 
Of particular interest in this article is program type. Program type may differentially af-
fect fear for several reasons outlined by Eschholz et al. (2003). Program characteristics as-
sociated with greater effects on fear include higher levels of violence, realistic depictions 
of crimes, and greater proximity of the criminal event to the viewer, such as an event re-
ported in someone’s neighborhood. In contrast, the portrayal of a just resolution to the 
criminal activity may serve to reduce fear. Accordingly, Eschholz et al. (2003) found that 
viewing national news and news magazine programs, which have lower levels of violence 
and proximal relevance, as well as muted realism, was unrelated to fear of crime. On the 
other hand, viewing local news, which has greater realism, proximate relevance, and a fo-
cus on serious crime, was related to fear. Crime dramas and reality crime shows were also 
linked to fear. Both kinds of programs have high levels of violence, and reality programs 
clearly offer high levels of realism. Interestingly, although both kinds of programs usually 
feature resolution, the resolution element did not appear to outweigh the other elements to 
negate fear. Eschholz et al. (2003) suggested that violence may be the most important ele-
ment in producing fear, given its presence in all forms of programming that were related 
to fear. 
Fearfulness is relevant because it is considered to be one mechanism by which the 
media shape public discourse about criminal justice policy (Warr 2000; Cavender 2004). 
Using data from the National Opinion Survey on Crime and Justice Dowler (2003) 
noted that crime program viewing (type not specified) was related to fear of crime, and 
that fear was related to both punitive attitudes and less confidence in police effective-
ness. In contrast, using data from Indiana that asked respondents about several media 
sources, Grabe and Drew (2007) found little evidence that any form of media was con-
sistently related to perceptions and opinions about crime and justice. Although a direct 
relationship between media consumption in general and fear of crime is equivocal, there 
appears to be a relationship among watching crime-related television, fear, and support 
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for more crime control and punitive measures,  particularly when audience reception 
characteristics are considered (Eschholz 2003; Surette 2003; Doyle 2006). 
Crime Programming as Infotainment 
In an expanding television universe that allows people to be more selective in their 
viewing habits, program type is an increasingly salient area for study. The emergence of 
a genre dedicated to nonfictional documentary style crime programming has added to 
people’s ability to gather more information about crime. This genre of programs, in for-
mat, falls somewhere between crime dramas and reality shows. In their study of “America’s 
Most Wanted” and “Unsolved Mysteries,” Cavender and Bond-Maupin (1993) concluded 
that these nonfiction programs were similar to crime dramas in their overdramatiza-
tion of crime and in their exaggerations of uncertainty and lack of safety. In reciprocal 
fashion, dramatic series like “Law & Order” create a sense of realism by using produc-
tion techniques originally developed on shows like “America’s Most Wanted” (Cavender, 
Bond-Maupin, and Jurik 1999). Dramas tap into, then sensationalize, current headlines 
(Eschholz, Mallard, and Flynn 2004). The headlines, which may be hundreds of miles away 
from the viewer, are developed into personalized narratives, thus making a distant issue 
more proximal to the viewer (Gans-Boriskin and Wardle 2005). 
Contemporary documentary style programs are similar to shows like “America’s 
Most Wanted” and “Unsolved Mysteries,” in conveying a sense of reality while portray-
ing the dramatic (Cavender 1998). Documentary style programs, by their nature, re-
quire collaboration between criminal justice agents and media organizations (Cavender 
and Fishman 1998). These programs describe real events, but they incorporate dramatic 
techniques, like reenactments, narration and music, emotional hooks, and cliffhangers 
before commercials. In addition to the use of dramatic reenactments, such shows in-
tertwine factual reports with “rumor and speculation,” blurring the distinction between 
news and entertainment, what some call “infotainment” (Sacco 1995:145). The factual 
information about a crime is supplemented with, and enhanced by, fictionalized rec-
reations (Doyle 1998). Evidence of a continued reciprocity between drama and docu-
mentary can be seen in programs like Investigation Discovery’s “Forensics: You Decide,” 
which invites viewers to draw conclusions about a real case based on the presentation of 
actual forensic evidence, just as the viewer is invited to do in forensics-based dramas like 
“CSI: Crime Scene Investigation.” 
One distinction between contemporary nonfiction shows and their predecessors is 
that they generally document only one or two stories during the 30- or 60-minute time 
slot. Contemporary shows align with what Surette (2003) describes as infotainment-news 
shows, dramatized programs disguised as in-depth reporting. Common threads include: a 
focus on serious or unusual crimes, a reliance on interviews with real-life participants and 
experts, and the unfolding of a narrative that follows the investigation and apprehension 
(Donovon 1998). For example, the description of “The First 48” reads:  
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For homicide detectives, the clock starts ticking the moment they are called. Their 
chance of solving a case is cut in half if they don’t get a lead in THE FIRST 48. Each 
passing hour gives suspects more time to flee, witnesses more time to forget what 
they saw, and crucial evidence more time to be lost forever. THE FIRST 48 follows 
detectives from around the country during these first critical hours as they race 
against time to find the suspect. Gritty and fast-paced, it takes viewers behind the 
scenes of real-life investigations with unprecedented access to crime scenes, autop-
sies, forensic processing, and interrogations. (A&E Television 2009) 
Donovon (1998) points out the tendency of the nonfictional format toward populism, 
in which the narrative of the story portrays “viewer-citizens” who are “collectively, univer-
sally, and uniformly hailed as ‘tired of crime’ ” (p. 128). The result is that, like ripped-from-
the-headlines dramas, the distant becomes personal. Considering the research on news, 
crime dramas, and reality shows, to the extent that nonfictional documentary style shows 
have high levels of violence, realism, and faux-proximity, viewership should be associated 
with greater fear of crime. Yet the unique nature of these programs suggests that viewer-
ship may have a relationship with fear of crime and criminal justice attitudes that is dis-
tinct from news and dramas. 
Crime Programming as Ideology 
Scholars recognize that the media, television in particular, is a way through which cul-
tural images about crime are disseminated and reinforced and through which criminal 
justice policy debates are shaped (Barlow, Barlow, and Chiricos 1995; Sacco 1995; Eschholz 
et al. 2003; Cavender 2004). Most people have little to no direct experience with crime and 
therefore must rely on other sources for information about crime and related issues (Barak 
1994; Chermak 1994; Surette 2003). The media is the public’s primary frame of reference 
for issues of crime and control, focusing attention on certain events and offering interpre-
tations for how to understand them (Barak 1994; Eschholz 1997). For instance, the dom-
inant theme in crime dramas is “justice”—capturing and punishing the offender—while 
implying that the only way to deal with offenders is incarceration (Eschholz et al. 2004). 
Likewise, nonfictional reality crime programs are informed by the conservative ideologies 
that support justice-based crime control policies (Cavender and Fishman 1998). 
According to Altheide (1997), the process of problem framing in the news media in-
forms the audience that some situation is undesirable, that many people are affected by 
it, and that the main contributing factors are identifiable. Further, the media suggests the 
“problem” can be changed, that mechanisms exist to change it, and that we (as a society) 
already have an agent and process in place to fix the problem, usually the government. In 
short, the discourse of fear that pervades the media encourages public reliance on formal 
social control (Altheide and Michalowski 1999).When it comes to the problem of crime, 
the media help to frame the notion that crime is a major problem for everyone, criminal-
ity results from individual characteristics, and that we can change the problem through 
enhancing the social control procedures already in place (Cavender and Fishman 1998; 
Surette 1998). As a result, it is difficult to “separate the perception of  crime and the reac-
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tion to crime” (Barak 1994:32). Observing the changes in crime news and drama begin-
ning in the 1970s and continuing to the present, Cavender (2004) contended: 
[N]ews and drama produced a kind of informational flow about crime. There also 
were parallel responses to the crime problem across news and drama: it was a vis-
ceral, ‘get tough’ approach. … As this response was replayed in the coverage of leg-
islative debates across the states, and in movies and TV drama, it eventually became 
THE solution; and, it became common sense. (P. 346) Describing why there is a lack 
of association between crime and incarceration rates, 
Lyons and Scheingold (2000) suggested that punitive policy shifts are driven by the elec-
toral needs of politicians. Further, the politicized nature of crime and punishment is situated 
in political discourse and public response, a relationship primarily mediated by the media 
(Lyons and Scheingold 2000). For instance, Lowry, Nio, and Leitner (2003) found that net-
work news coverage of crime explained more of the variance in the public opinion ranking 
of crime-as-the-most-important-problem than did the actual UCR crime rate. Kappeler and 
Potter (2005) argued that the media is a powerful source of myths about crime and justice. 
These myths perpetuate cultural meanings about crime, offenders, victims, and social con-
trol. Ultimately, if the public accepts these myths, the various needs of the crime-industrial 
complex, government social control agencies, and the media are met. In other words, vari-
ous groups have a vested interest in the public’s continuing concern about crime in order to 
maintain viewership (in the case of the media) and to maintain public support for a punitive, 
criminal justice-oriented approach to dealing with the social problem of crime. 
Gerbner (1970) asserted that the perceptions and feelings cultivated by television have 
consequences not only for people’s social relationships, but also great potential to shape 
social policy in general and social control in particular. Indeed, as Altheide (2009) argued, 
fear is the driving emotion behind shifts in crime control and government intervention 
efforts. Research that looks directly at the political effects of presumed public response 
to crime “waves” (i.e., fear) indicates that such fears can promote political shifts (Doyle 
2006). Fear is not a conspiracy but a convergence of goals, including politicians seeking an 
issue, the punitive tendencies of the American public, the content of the news and other 
media, and the professional motivations of the crime-industrial complex (Surette 1994). In 
sum, perceptions about and fear of crime represent key mechanisms by which television 
can shape opinions about criminal justice policy. 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
In general, if it is the case that crime-related programming, including news, dramas, and 
nonfiction documentary style shows, supports the prevailing criminal justice ideology, then 
it should be directly associated with support for the criminal justice system and support for 
policies like the death penalty. Moreover, if crime-related programming functions to main-
tain or perpetuate concern or fear about crime, then it should be indirectly associated with 
criminal justice attitudes via its effect on fear. In this study, we  explored whether the type of 
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programming people watch differentially influences their fears about crime and their percep-
tions of the crime rate, comparing local and national news, crime dramas, and nonfictional 
documentary style programming. Then, we explored whether the program type influences 
people’s support for the criminal justice system and their support for the harshest criminal 
justice policy, the death penalty. Finally, we examined whether fear mediates the relationship 
between program type and these attitudes about the criminal justice system. 
METHODS 
Sample 
The data used in this study come from the 2007 Nebraska Annual Social Indicator Sur-
vey (NASIS), which is a joint effort of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Bureau of Socio-
logical Research, the Department of Sociology at the University of Nebraska- Lincoln, and 
a variety of public agencies. The survey is conducted using Computer- Assisted Telephone 
Interviewing (CATI) by interviewers well-trained in CATI procedures. 
The sample of respondents is drawn from a population consisting of noninstitution-
alized persons ages 19 and older in households with telephones, who resided in the State 
of Nebraska during the survey period (February 2008 to August 2008). The sample comes 
from a directory-listed sample of telephone numbers in Nebraska. The sample includes 
telephone numbers for individuals and households who have a landline telephone number 
published within Nebraska telephone directories. The adult in the household with whom 
the interviewer was to speak was randomly selected from among all eligible respondents in 
the household by asking the person who answered the telephone for the number of adults 
living in the household, and, based on random selection by the computer, requesting to 
speak with the adult who is of a certain age category (e.g., youngest, oldest, middle). 
The sample was 94.8 percent white, 41 percent male, with a mean age of 54.8, a median 
household income of $50,000 to $59,000, and less than a four-year college education. The 
original sample size was 879, and final sample size after listwise deletion of missing cases 
was 784. 
Measures 
The first dependent variable, support for the criminal justice system, was assessed with 
two dimensions measuring attitudes about the justice system. The first dimension, confi-
dence, was measured with three questions: “How confident are you that the criminal jus-
tice system can reduce crime”; “How confident are you that police can protect society from 
violent crimes”; and “How confident are you that police can protect society from property 
crimes?” Response options ranged from 0 (not at all confident) to 3 (very confident). The 
second dimension, fairness, was measured with three questions: “How fair is the treatment 
by the justice system of people accused of committing a crime”; “How fair is treatment by 
the justice system of people victimized”; “How fair is the  application of the death penalty 
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by the justice system?” Responses ranged from 0 (not at all fair) to 3 (very fair). Explor-
atory factor analysis indicated that these six items loaded onto a single factor. An overall 
indicator of support for the criminal justice system was created by averaging responses to 
the six questions, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.73. 
The second dependent variable, support for the death penalty, was assessed with one 
question. The respondent was asked: “If you could choose among the following ap-
proaches, which do you think is the best penalty for murder?” The response options were 
prison with the possibility of parole once the offender has reformed, life in prison without 
the possibility of parole, and death penalty. The variable was coded so that 1 equaled death 
penalty support, and the other categories were zero. 
Two variables measured the frequency with which respondents watch television pro-
gramming related to crime in an average week. Days watch TV crime drama was mea-
sured with the item “How many days in an average week do you watch TV crime dramas 
like ‘Law and Order’ or ‘CSI’?” Days watch crime non-fiction was assessed with the item 
“How many days in an average week do you watch nonfictional programs about crime, like 
those on ABC’s ‘Primetime’, CourtTV, or the Discovery Channel?” In addition, two vari-
ables measured the frequency with which respondents may have been exposed to informa-
tion about crime on television news. Days watch local news was assessed by asking respon-
dents the number of days in an average week they watched any of the local news programs 
in their area. Similarly, days watch national news was measured by asking respondents the 
number of days in an average week they watched national network news programs or cable 
news channels. For all these items, responses ranged from 0 (zero days per week) to 7 (ev-
ery day of the week). 
Fear of crime was assessed with six questions regarding how often respondents person-
ally worried about being victimized, including worry about walking alone at night, getting 
robbed, having their residence broken into, being sexually assaulted, getting murdered, and 
having someone in his/her family becoming a victim of a crime. Response options ranged 
from 0 (never) to 4 (almost always). Responses to the six items were averaged into an over-
all indicator of fear. Cronbach’s alpha equaled 0.82. This scale is similar to that used in Gallup 
polls and in other research (Ditton et al. 2004). Assessments of safety or risk are potentially 
important components of fear (Warr 2000). Following Chiricos et al. (1997), the regression 
analyses examined respondents’ perceptions of the crime rate. Two separate measures of the 
crime rate were used: U.S. crime rate and local crime rate. The respondents were asked to fin-
ish the statement: “The rate of crime in the United States [alternately, my area] seems to be 
…” with a response of decreasing, staying the same, or increasing. Responses were coded so 
that –1 equaled decreasing, 0 equaled staying the same, and 1 equaled increasing. 
Control variables used in the analyses included trust in sources of information about 
crime, prior victimization, and political ideology. The extent to which viewers trust the 
crime information transmitted by the media and government sources may influence how 
they interpret images seen on television. To control for this, trust information was assessed 
with two questions related to the reliability of information about crime: “How reliable is 
the media as a source of information about crime?” and “How reliable is the  government 
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as a source of information about crime?” Response categories ranged from 1 (not at all re-
liable) to 4 (very reliable). Kappeler and Potter (2005) asserted that the media and govern-
ment work together to construct messages and images about crime. Factor analysis indi-
cated that the two items did load on a single factor, so the responses to the two questions 
were averaged into an overall indicator of trust. 
Victim was a dichotomous variable in which respondents answered yes or no to the 
question about whether they had been a victim of crime in the last year, and was coded 
so that 1 equaled yes. Political ideology may also impact people’s attitudes about the jus-
tice system, independent of their media viewing. The control variable conservative was as-
sessed with an item that asked respondents to rate themselves politically using a five-point 
scale. Following prior research on public attitudes toward the criminal justice system (Ap-
plegate et al. 2000; Unnever, Benson, and Cullen 2008), the variable was coded so that 1 
was very liberal, and 5 was very conservative. 
Audience characteristics may affect the relationship between media viewing and fear of 
crime (Chiricos et al. 1997). Accordingly, the regression analyses controlled for respondents’ 
demographic characteristics, including age, education, race, sex, and residential location. 
Age and education were continuous variables measured in years. Race was a dummy variable 
with Nonwhite coded as 1 and white as reference category. Gender was a dummy variable 
with male coded as 1. Respondents were asked to indicate their residential location as farm, 
open country, or town/city. Because of smaller frequencies relative to the town/city category, 
the response categories farm and open country were combined into rural. The dummy vari-
able was coded so that 1 equaled town/city, and rural was the reference category. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Chi-square tests were performed 
to determine if viewership varied by audience characteristics. Although the majority of 
respondents watched local news every day, those with more than a high school educa-
tion watched local news more often (χ2 = 23.71, p < .001). In addition, they watched na-
tional news slightly more often as well (χ2 = 20.86, p < .01). Those with more education 
also watched nonfiction crime shows more often (χ2 = 28.78, p < .001). There were no dif-
ferences in viewing crime dramas by level of education. 
Compared with those aged 35 and older, those aged 19–34 were significantly less likely 
to watch local (χ2 = 64.41, p < .001) or national news (χ2 = 61.71, p < .001) every day. There 
were no age differences in viewing either crime dramas or nonfiction crime shows. Women 
watched local news more often than men (χ2 = 23.01, p < .01). They were also more likely 
to report watching crime dramas more frequently (χ2 = 14.83, p < .05), but there were no 
sex differences in viewing nonfiction crime shows. White respondents reported viewing 
nonfiction crime shows slightly less often than nonwhite respondents (χ2 = 15.87, p < .05). 
There were no racial differences in viewing the other program types. No residential loca-
tion differences were noted in any of the viewership variables.  
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Table 2 presents correlations among the variables. Both frequency of viewing crime 
dramas and frequency of viewing nonfictional crime shows were positively correlated with 
fear of crime and support for the death penalty. Frequency of viewing nonfictional crime 
shows was negatively correlated with support for the criminal justice system; viewing 
crime dramas was unrelated. Fear was negatively correlated with confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system, but fear was unrelated to support for the death penalty. There was also 
a degree of correlation among all four of the viewership variables. In particular, the news 
viewership variables were highly correlated with each other, and crime drama and nonfic-
tion program viewership variables were highly correlated with each other. 
Table 3 presents OLS regressions on fear of crime and perceptions of the crime rate. 
Of the control variables, males were less likely to be fearful, and younger people and peo-
ple who had been victims of crime in the previous year were more likely to be fearful. Of 
the viewership variables, only frequency of viewing nonfictional crime shows contributed 
to higher levels of fear. The other media variables were not statistically significant. Regard-
ing perceptions of the U.S. crime rate, older people perceived the crime rate to be increas-
ing. Males, people with higher levels of education, and people who trusted information 
sources thought the crime rate was decreasing. The media variables were not statistically 
significant. Regarding perceptions of the local crime rate, people who had been victims of 
crime in the previous year perceived the crime rate to be increasing. Males and people who 
trusted information sources thought the crime rate was decreasing. Of the viewership vari-
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample (N = 784) 
Variables  Mean  SD  Range  α 
Age  54.49  16.00  19–96 
Education  14.51  2.74  2–22 
Nonwhite = 1  .05  .22  0,1 
Male = 1  .41  .49  0,1 
Town/city = 1  .81  .39  0,1 
Conservative ideology  3.33  .89  1–5 
Trust information  1.22  .55  0–3 
Victim = 1  .11  .31  0,1 
Days watch local news  5.41  2.22  0–7 
Days watch national news  4.38  2.56  0–7 
Days watch TV crime dramas  1.81  2.08  0–7 
Days watch nonfiction crime  1.42  1.76  0–7 
Fear of crime  1.29  .71  0–4  .82 
U.S. crime rate  .57  .62  –1 to 1 
Local crime rate  .30  .56  –1 to 1 
Confidence in CJS  1.37  .49  0–3  .73 
Support death penalty = 1  .45  .50  0,1 
CJS = Criminal Justice System 
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ables, only frequency of viewing local news predicted the perception that the local crime 
rate was increasing. 
Table 4 presents OLS regressions on support for the criminal justice system. In model 
1, both education and trust in the government and media as sources of information posi-
tively predicted support for the justice system. On the other hand, people who experienced 
prior victimization were less supportive. Viewing crime dramas and news broadcasts was 
unrelated to support for the justice system, but viewing nonfictional crime shows contrib-
uted to less support. Although several interaction terms between the media variables were 
tested, none were statistically significant. In model 2, fear was introduced into the regres-
sion. Fear entirely mediated the relationship between viewing nonfictional crime shows 
and support for the justice system. Higher levels of fear contributed to less support for the 
criminal justice system. In model 3, perceptions of U.S. and local crime rates were entered 
into the model. Fear remained statistically significant. People who perceived the U.S. crime 
rate to be increasing were less supportive of the justice system, but perceptions of the local 
crime rate were unrelated to support. 
Table 5 presents logistic regressions on support for the death penalty. In model 1, town 
and city dwellers were less likely to support the death penalty, whereas those with a more 
conservative political ideology were more likely to support it. Unlike support for the crim-
inal justice system, viewing nonfictional crime shows was unrelated to death penalty sup-
port, whereas viewing crime dramas predicted death penalty support. Each additional day 
of viewing crime dramas increased the odds of supporting the death penalty by 11 per-
cent. Again, both news viewing variables were statistically no significant, and no interac-
tion terms were significant. In model 2, fear was introduced into the regression, and in 
model 3, perceptions of the crime rate were introduced into the regression. Fear was un-
related to death penalty support, as were perceptions of the crime rate. These variables did 
not mediate the relationship between viewing crime dramas and death penalty support. 
DISCUSSION 
The results reveal a complex relationship among viewership patterns, fear of crime, 
and attitudes about the criminal justice system. Consistent with Curette’s (1994) argu-
ment, the public audience appeared to negatively evaluate the criminal justice system 
while simultaneously supporting more punitive policies. The results presented here, 
which controlled for audience characteristics, indicate that this variation is due in part 
to the types of programs people watch. On the one hand, the more often people watched 
nonfictional crime programming, the more fearful they were of criminal victimization. 
Fear and the perception of an increasing national crime rate appeared to undermine 
their confidence in the ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime, protect cit-
izens, and treat them fairly. On the other hand, there was no significant relationship be-
tween viewing crime dramas and fear, yet the more often people watched crime dramas, 
the more likely they were to support the death penalty. Interestingly, when   controlling 
Crime Programming, Fear oF Crime, and attitudes about the Criminal JustiCe system     49
Ta
bl
e 
4.
 O
rd
in
ar
y 
Le
as
t 
Sq
ua
re
s 
Re
gr
es
si
on
s 
Pr
ed
ic
tin
g 
C
on
fid
en
ce
 in
 t
he
 C
rim
in
al
 J
us
tic
e 
Sy
st
em
 (N
 =
 7
84
) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
M
od
el
 1
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
M
od
el
 2
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  M
od
el
 3
 
Va
ria
bl
es
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 B
   
   
   
  S
E 
   
   
   
Be
ta
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
B 
   
   
   
 S
E 
   
   
   
Be
ta
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
B 
   
   
   
  S
E 
   
   
  B
et
a 
Ag
e 
.0
0 
[.0
0]
 
–.
03
 
.0
0 
[.0
0]
 
–.
05
 
.0
0 
[.0
0]
 
–.
03
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
.0
2 
[.0
1]
 
.1
1*
* 
.0
2 
[.0
1]
 
.1
0*
* 
.0
1 
[.0
1]
 
.0
8*
 
N
on
w
hi
te
 =
 1
 
–.
14
 
[.0
7]
 
–.
06
 
–.
12
 
[.0
7]
 
–.
06
 
–.
11
 
[.0
7]
 
–.
05
 
M
al
e 
=
 1
 
.0
1 
[.0
3]
 
.0
1 
–.
05
 
[.0
3]
 
–.
05
 
–.
06
 
[.0
3]
 
–.
06
 
To
w
n/
ci
ty
 =
 1
 
.0
2 
[.0
4]
 
.0
2 
.0
3 
[.0
4]
 
.0
3 
.0
3 
[.0
4]
 
.0
2 
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
id
eo
lo
gy
 
.0
3 
[.0
2]
 
.0
5 
.0
3 
[.0
2]
 
.0
5 
.0
3 
[.0
2]
 
.0
5 
Tr
us
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
.4
1 
[.0
5]
 
.4
6*
**
 
.4
0 
[.0
3]
 
.4
5*
**
 
.3
9 
[.0
3]
 
.4
4*
**
 
Vi
ct
im
 =
 1
 
–.
19
 
[.0
5]
 
–.
12
**
* 
–.
17
 
[.0
5]
 
–.
10
**
* 
–.
15
 
[.0
5]
 
–.
09
**
 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 lo
ca
l n
ew
s 
 .0
0 
[.0
1]
 
–.
02
 
.0
0 
[.0
1]
 
–.
01
 
.0
0 
[.0
1]
 
.0
0 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 n
at
io
na
l n
ew
s 
.0
1 
[.0
1]
 
.0
5 
.0
1 
[.0
1]
 
.0
6 
.0
1 
[.0
1]
 
.0
5 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 T
V 
cr
im
e 
dr
am
a 
.0
0 
[.0
1]
 
.0
0 
.0
1 
[.0
1]
 
.0
1 
.0
0 
[.0
1]
 
.0
0 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 n
on
fic
tio
n 
cr
im
e 
–.
02
 
[.0
1]
 
–.
08
* 
–.
02
 
[.0
1]
 
–.
05
 
–.
02
 
[.0
1]
 
–.
05
 
Fe
ar
 o
f c
rim
e 
 
 
 
–.
12
 
[.0
2]
 
–.
17
**
* 
–.
10
 
[.0
2]
 
–.
14
**
* 
U
.S
. c
rim
e 
ra
te
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–.
10
 
[.0
3]
 
–.
12
**
* 
Lo
ca
l c
rim
e 
ra
te
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–.
06
 
[.0
3]
 
–.
06
 
Ad
ju
st
ed
 R
2  
.2
46
 
 
 
.2
69
 
 
 
.2
86
* 
p 
<
 .0
5 
;  
**
 p
 <
 .0
1 
;  
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
50 Kort-butler &  sittner hartshorn in The Sociological QuarTerly 52 (2011) 
Ta
bl
e 
5.
 L
og
is
tic
 R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 P
re
di
ct
in
g 
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 th
e 
D
ea
th
 P
en
al
ty
 (N
 =
 7
84
)
  
M
od
el
 1
  
 
 
M
od
el
 2
   
 
M
od
el
 3
 
Va
ria
bl
es
  
B 
 
SE
  
Ex
p(
b)
  
B 
 
SE
  
Ex
p(
b)
  
B 
 
SE
  
Ex
p(
b)
 
Ag
e 
–.
01
 
[.0
1]
 
.9
9 
–.
01
 
[.0
1]
 
.9
9 
–.
01
 
[.0
1]
 
.9
9 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
–.
06
 
[.0
3]
 
.9
5 
–.
05
 
[.0
3]
 
.9
5 
–.
06
 
[.0
3]
 
.9
5 
N
on
w
hi
te
 =
 1
 
–.
71
 
[.3
9]
 
.4
9 
–.
73
 
[.3
9]
 
.4
8 
–.
74
 
[.3
9]
 
.4
8 
M
al
e 
=
 1
 
.3
0 
[.1
6]
 
1.
35
 
.3
5 
[.1
7]
 
1.
42
* 
.3
6 
[.1
7]
 
1.
44
* 
To
w
n/
ci
ty
 =
 1
 
–.
56
 
[.1
9]
 
.5
7*
* 
–.
57
 
[.1
9]
 
.5
7*
* 
–.
57
 
[.1
9]
 
.5
6*
* 
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
id
eo
lo
gy
 
.4
1 
[.0
9]
 
1.
51
**
* 
.4
1 
[.0
9]
 
1.
51
**
* 
.4
1 
[.0
9]
 
1.
51
**
* 
Tr
us
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
–.
22
 
[.1
4]
 
.8
1 
–.
21
 
[.1
4]
 
.8
1 
–.
20
 
[.1
4]
 
.8
2 
Vi
ct
im
 =
 1
 
–.
01
 
[.2
5]
 
.9
9 
–.
03
 
[.2
5]
 
.9
7 
–.
05
 
[.2
5]
 
.9
5 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 lo
ca
l n
ew
s 
.0
4 
[.0
4]
 
1.
04
 
.0
3 
[.0
4]
 
1.
04
 
.0
3 
[.0
4]
 
1.
03
 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 n
at
io
na
l n
ew
s 
–.
01
 
[.0
4]
 
.9
9 
–.
01
 
[.0
4]
 
.9
9 
–.
01
 
[.0
4]
 
.9
9 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 T
V 
cr
im
e 
dr
am
a 
.1
1 
[.0
4]
 
1.
11
**
 
.1
1 
[.0
4]
 
1.
11
**
 
.1
1 
[.0
4]
 
1.
11
**
 
D
ay
s 
w
at
ch
 n
on
fic
tio
n 
cr
im
e 
.0
4 
[.0
5]
 
1.
04
 
.0
4 
[.0
5]
 
1.
04
 
.0
4 
[.0
5]
 
1.
04
 
Fe
ar
 o
f c
rim
e 
 
 
 
.1
2 
[.1
2]
 
1.
12
 
.1
0 
[.1
2]
 
1.
11
 
U
.S
. c
rim
e 
ra
te
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0
2 
[.1
3]
 
1.
02
Lo
ca
l c
rim
e 
ra
te
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0
9 
[.1
4]
 
1.
09
 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
–.
08
 
[.6
9]
 
.9
3 
–.
27
 
[.7
2]
 
.7
7 
–.
27
 
[.7
3]
 
.7
7 
* 
p 
<
 .0
5 
;  
**
 p
 <
 .0
1 
;  
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
Crime Programming, Fear oF Crime, and attitudes about the Criminal JustiCe system     51
for audience characteristics and other viewership patterns, news viewership predicted 
neither fear of crime nor criminal justice attitudes. 
Why should different kinds of programming result in different outcomes? When it comes 
to the portrayal of violence, both crime dramas and nonfictional crime programming focus 
on serious crimes. However, nonfictional programs by their nature offer more realism, and 
nonfictional images may simply have greater psychological impact than fictional ones (Koo-
istra, Mahoney, and Westervelt 1998). Moreover, in telling the story, nonfictional programs 
offer more context. Interviews with victims, their families, and friends can be manipulated 
to emphasize how the crime could happen to anyone, playing on fear for dramatic impact 
while increasing a sense of proximity. Whereas crime dramas are set in large cities, nonfic-
tional programs are frequently set in smaller cities or suburban areas. Additionally, nonfic-
tional programs often try to delve into the offender’s personal history to explain his or her 
behavior, while highlighting his or her ability to evade detection by the authorities. Although 
the authorities may not be portrayed as incompetent, they always seem one step behind the 
offender. By comparison, crime dramas present cases in starker terms, portraying offend-
ers as evil and the criminal justice system as moral authority, while providing less context for 
the offense and greater finality in case resolution (Eschholz et al. 2003; Cavender and Deutch 
2007). Viewers of crime dramas can be assured that criminal justice personnel get the job 
done and the offender gets his or her just deserts. 
Fear of crime entirely mediated the relationship between watching nonfictional tele-
vision crime programs and support for the criminal justice system: the more fearful peo-
ple were, the less supportive they were of the ability of the criminal justice system to deal 
with crime. This indicates that viewing nonfictional documentary programs about crime 
serves an infotainment function. These shows provide information about criminal events 
but can contribute to the idea that crime in the United States is out of control. Moreover, 
these shows also provide information on the challenges faced by the criminal justice sys-
tem to deal with crime swiftly and fairly, all within an entertainment context that amplifies 
fear for dramatic effect. 
Fear of crime was unrelated to support of the death penalty, as were perceptions of the 
crime rate. Identifying with a conservative political ideology, however, positively predicted 
support for the death penalty. This suggests that viewing television crime drama, which 
was also related to death penalty support, can serve an ideological function. The ideologi-
cal undertones of crime dramas may be more relevant for policy support than these shows’ 
ability to induce concern or fear about crime. In other words, to the extent that crime dra-
mas disseminate and reinforce dominant ideological positions on crime and criminal jus-
tice through their focus on serious crime and just deserts, viewing such programs serves to 
maintain public support for the death penalty. 
One reason that fear may be unrelated to death penalty support is that fear may not 
be the emotion people draw on when considering criminal justice options. According 
to Lyons and Scheingold (2000), “The anxieties associated with unwelcome social, eco-
nomic, and cultural transformations generate anger, and punishment becomes a vehicle 
for that anger” (p. 127). Johnson (2009) found that anger about crime was positively  re-
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lated to support for punitive policies, controlling for fear. The tidy endings of shows like 
“Law & Order” allow viewers to leave the program without concerns that criminals are 
getting away with it and being released onto the streets (Gans-Boriskin and Wardle 2005). 
In short, viewers can take comfort that crime, in all its complexities, can be handled. Dra-
mas emphasize that the social world seems increasingly complex and confusing, but deal-
ing with crime via increasing punitiveness seems straightforward (Cavender 1998; Lyons 
and Scheingold 2000). 
There were methodological limitations to this study. First, the survey was of a sam-
ple from one state, which is not necessarily representative of other populations. People in 
more urbanized states, more racially diverse states, more politically diverse states, and in 
states with objectively higher crime rates may have different perceptions of crime. On the 
other hand, because of their lower proximity and exposure to crime relative to other states, 
Nebraskans may be more reliant on the media as a source of information about crime. 
Future research should consider nationally representative samples to explore this topic in 
greater detail. 
Second, there was only one item asking respondents about their viewership of nonfic-
tional programming. Although the item prompted respondents to think about shows like 
those described above, respondents may have also had in mind reality shows like “COPS” 
or “America’s Most Wanted.” In the future, researchers should attempt to discriminate more 
completely among types of programming. Third, certain question formats could have in-
fluenced results. The viewership questions asked average viewing per week. A longer time 
frame, such as average viewing per month, may have included more respondents. Also, 
there was no question on total hours of viewing, which would have allowed for a statistical 
control to gauge proportion of time spent watching other kinds of programming. Fourth, 
it should be noted that viewership of each type of programming was strongly correlated, so 
that people who frequently watched one kind of program also watched the other. The for-
mat of the questions precluded our ability to separate fully the effect of one from another. 
Finally, the cross-sectional nature of the survey does not allow for statements of causality. 
Given the historical and ongoing saturation of crime in the media, it may be impossible 
to understand fully if media exposure has a causal impact on fear of crime and attitudes 
about criminal justice. Future researchers could consider quasiexperimental or longitudi-
nal designs to assess the specificity and directionality of the relationships observed here. 
Given these limitations, this study demonstrated, albeit conservatively, that what peo-
ple watch on television matters when it comes to fear of crime and their attitudes about 
criminal justice. Crime-related programming shapes both personal fear of crime and the 
social response to crime (Kooistra et al. 1998). If there is a causal relationship between 
media consumption and fear of crime, the mechanisms by which media images influence 
people’s perceptions about crime and criminal justice remain less understood (Heath and 
Gilbert 1996;Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). People who are fearful and/or who lack support 
for the criminal justice system may be disposed to watching certain kinds of programs, 
which may reinforce rather than bring about their anxieties and other attitudes. Others 
may watch crime programming for reassurance that justice ultimately  triumphs when an 
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offender is caught and convicted, reducing their fear while reinforcing their beliefs. Dit-
ton et al.’s (2004) research indicated that understanding how the viewer perceives and in-
terprets the media may be more relevant than measuring how much of certain kind of pro-
gramming a person watches. 
Future research should also consider a comparative content analysis of crime dramas 
and nonfictional documentary-style crime shows. Similar themes may be detected, but 
subtle differences in the portrayal of crime and justice may appear. For example, the open-
ing credits of NBC’s “Law and Order: SVU” state: “In the criminal justice system, sexu-
ally based offenses are considered especially heinous. In New York City, the dedicated de-
tectives who investigate these vicious felonies are members of an elite squad known as the 
Special Victims Unit. These are their stories. “By comparison, a description of the pro-
gram “Main Street Mysteries” aired on Investigation Discovery Channel (2010) reads: “Big 
crimes in small towns can cause fear and panic within tight-knit communities. Follow 
these small town investigators on mystifying cases to bring closure to the victims and their 
loved ones.” Through such content analyses, especially if paired with research examining 
viewers’ interpretations of different types of programs, we may gain a better understand-
ing of why research on media consumption, fear of crime, and support for criminal justice 
policies has been equivocal. As the media continues to evolve, research must continue to 
explore why people view crime-related programming or access crime-related information, 
how they interpret it, and what impact it has on fear and other emotions, support for the 
criminal justice system, and criminal justice policies. 
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